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Intergenerational Top Income Persistence: Denmark half the size of Sweden  
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate intergenerational top earnings and top income mobility in Denmark. 
Access to administrative registers allowed us to look at very small fractions of the population. We 
find that intergenerational mobility is lower in the top when including capital income in the income 
measure - for the rich top 0.1 % fathers and sons the elasticity is 0.466. Compared with Sweden, 
however, the intergenerational top income persistence is smaller in Denmark. 
Keywords: Intergenerational top income persistence, top incomes, piecewise (spline) regression. 
JEL classification: C2; D3; D6 
I. Introduction 
Intergenerational income mobility is key to the understanding of how individual opportunities and 
social status vary across groups and between countries. Here, we present novel estimates for the 
father-son intergenerational top income mobility for Denmark and compare them with similar 
estimates for Sweden. We find that intergenerational top income persistence in Denmark is smaller 
than in Sweden and present some possible explanations for this finding. 
II. Background 
The literature shows that top income shares in the Western world are increasing (Atkinson et al., 
2011; Piketty, 2014; Roine & Waldenström 2015) and that intergenerational father-son income 
mobility is small for high incomes, reaching a very low level for the top end of the income 
distribution. In particular, this holds for Sweden, which despite its relatively low income inequality 
and high intergenerational income mobility, has a 0.1 % top income elasticity of 0.896 compared 
with an overall elasticity of 0.260 (Björklund et al., 2012). Björklund et al. (2012) further find that 
3 
 
capital income is the prominent channel in the transmission at the very top of the income 
distribution. 
The question addressed here is whether the high intergenerational top income persistence found for 
rich Swedes also holds for rich Danes— given that Sweden and Denmark can be characterized as 
Scandinavian welfare regimes with similar levels of earnings mobility (Hussain et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, the two countries have different capital income distributions and industrial structures 
– for example, major companies in Sweden are larger than their counterparts in Denmark.  
III. Empirical framework 
Based on practice within mobility studies, the intergenerational determination of children’s incomes 
can be expressed by the following regression equation: 
 
(1) log yci = αc + βc log ypi + εci , 
 
where log yci denotes the natural logarithm of income of a child in family i and ypi the corresponding 
measure of the parent. We control for the age and age squared of the parent (p) and child (c). The 
error term εci depicts the combined effect on the child’s income of factors orthogonal to parental 
income, and βc is the intergenerational elasticity of the child’s income given the parent’s income.  
 Because  inheritance is not equally strong across the whole income distribution—revealed as 
nonlinearity (Bratberg et al., 2007)—intergenerational income mobility is analysed over the full 
income range by using piecewise linear regression estimations (spline regressions). This implies 
“separate” estimations for parent-child pairs belonging to different parent income percentiles—P25, 
P50, P75, P90, P95, P99, P99.9—which allow the slopes to vary over the earnings and income 
distributions (Greene, 2012). Therefore, the interpretation of the β-coefficient in equation (1) is the 
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percentage differential in the expected earnings or income of the son, given a percentage differential 
in earnings or income of the parent, for example, within the top P99.9-100 fractile. 
  
IV. Data 
The data stem from administrative registers at Statistics Denmark including information on 
earnings, capital income, and benefit payments for the period 1980–2008. A unique personal 
identification number allows merging of the information of every father and son. The father is in 
almost all cases the biological father, but if there is no information, then the step father living with 
the mother at the end of the son’s birth year is used. Using register information implies that there 
are no coverage problems, but the capital incomes may nevertheless suffer from evasion and 
avoidance and improper imputation of income from owner-occupied housing and other capital 
goods. 
 In this study, the second generation (sons) is aged 35–42 years in 2008 or, equivalently, 7–
14 years in 1980 (father incomes are measured from 1980 to 1984). This relatively broad age 
bracket is important for minimizing the problem of non-homogeneity in the residuals, see Solon 
(1992), Zimmerman (1992), Haider & Solon (2006), Hussain et al. (2009) and Lee & Solon (2009): 
i.e. individuals with high lifetime income tend to have steeper income growth trajectories. Nybom 
& Stuhler (2014) also stresses that incomes measured around midlife causes the smallest life-cycle 
bias. 
However, even permanent income estimates based on 5-year periods may underestimate the 
intergenerational persistence, see e.g. Hendricks (2007) showing that measures of persistence based 
on lifetime earnings increase 30% compared with measures using only 5-year periods. Here, fathers 
are aged between 25 and 88 years in 1984 why we control for their age. The income concepts 
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include individual earnings from work, business, and capital income (incl. capital gains of stocks), 
see Björklund et al. (2012) using similar definitions, and Roine & Waldenström (2012), who 
demonstrate that realized capital gains are very important in the Swedish setting. Moreover, only 
individuals with positive earnings or income in each of the five years (2004–2008 for the child and 
1980–1984 for the parent) are included. Incomes are inflated to 2008 by the CPI from Statistics 
Denmark.  
We exclude observations if the absolute dfbeta diagnostic, which detects individual observations 
with unusually high influence on parameter estimates (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 2005), is above 
2/n
½
 and the absolute standardised residual is above 3. These outliers count for only 1½ % of the 
observations, but the exclusion has no impact on the estimated coefficients’ structure, i.e. the 
correlation coefficients for the estimates with and without the outliers are above 0.96. The number 
of observations is 1,993 (earnings) and 2,612 (income) in the top percentile and, thereby, 199–261 
in the 0.1 top income percentile (fewer observations for earnings).  
V. Results 
Table 1 show that the intergenerational earnings and income elasticities for father-son increase up to 
a certain point and then decrease, leaving the top percentile out of consideration: The father-son 
income elasticity is 0.065 for the P0-25 group, 0.428 for the upper-middle P50-75 group, and 0.199 
for the P99-99.9 group. At the very top end of the distribution (P99.9-100), we found that only the 
income elasticity for father-son is significant, and high, i.e. a 10% higher income among the P99.9-
100 group of fathers implies on average a 4.66% (estimated βc=0.466) higher income among their 
sons. 
In comparison, the intergenerational income elasticity at the P99.9-100 fractile (0.1%) in Sweden is 
0.896 for father-son (Björklund et al., 2012) and hence is nearly double the size of that for Denmark 
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(a t-test =1.92 significant on a 5.5 % level shows a difference). For the group P99-99.9, the income 
elasticity for Sweden is also greater than that for Denmark (0.392 versus 0.199). The top earnings 
elasticity for Denmark is insignificant, whereas it is positive and significant (0. 447) for Sweden; 
accordingly, top earnings mobility is less likely in Sweden than in Denmark. For the lower and 
middle part of the father-son income and earnings distributions, we found similar nonlinearities in 
Denmark as in Sweden.  
 
 
Table 1. Earnings and total income elasticities for father and son. Spline regression . Denmark 
   OLS=IGE P0-25 P25-50 P50-75 P75-90 P90-95 P95-99 P99-99.9 P99.9-100 
Earnings (n=199336): 
         
Estimate 0.171*** 0.022** 0.304** 0.413** 0.243** 0.281** 0.220** 0.162** -0.076 
St. error 0.002 0.003 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.034 0.024 0.037 0.085 
Income
1
 (n=261248): 
         Estimate 0.241*** 0.065** 0.390** 0.428** 0.345** 0.252** 0.288** 0.199** 0.466** 
St. error 0.002 0.004 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.031 0.020 0.031 0.071 
1
Earnings, capital income and income transfers. 
 ** 0.01<p<0.05, ***<0.0001.  
  
The persistence for the two measures increases along the income distribution and reaches a 
maximum at the P50-75 knot after which it decreases to the same levels up to the P99-P99.9 fractile 
in both countries. Additionally, the differentials between the income and earnings coefficients are of 
similar magnitude.   
Moreover, the overall (regression to the mean) intergenerational income elasticity is of the same 
magnitude in Sweden (0.260) (Björklund et al., 2012) as in Denmark (0.241). Capital income is 
found to be the most important channel of top income intergenerational persistence, but apparently 
more so in Sweden than in Denmark. A possible explanation is that inheritance of capital income 
and large companies over generations play a bigger role in Sweden than in Denmark given 
thatcapital income in Sweden constitutes a bigger share of total income in the top 0.1 % end of the 
distribution than in Denmark (Figure 1)and the structure of businesses is different in the two 
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countries. The largest Swedish enterprises (250+ employees) represent 41% of total value added, 
while the largest Danish enterprises represent relatively less value added (33%) (OECD, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 1. Share of capital income in Denmark and Sweden. P99.9-100 
 
Source: Own calculations: Swedish data based on the The World Top  
Incomes Database (http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/)  
Danish data based on register data from Statistics Denmark. 
 
 
Hence, Sweden’s largest private enterprises are bigger than their counterparts in Denmark. The 
inheritance of the bigger enterprise ownerships (sometimes incl. CEO positions) and capital income 
in the top – may explain the lower top intergenerational mobility among Swedes. 
 
VI. Conclusion and Summary 
Here, we considered the intergenerational elasticities between fathers and sons’ earnings and 
incomes in the top end of the distributions in Denmark and compared them with findings for 
Sweden.  
We found that intergenerational elasticity is higher for income than for earnings, and that the 
elasticity increases with higher levels of earnings and income. For both Denmark and Sweden, 
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nonlinearities in the father-son relationships over the income distribution are found, and at the very 
top end of the distribution—P99.9-100—the father-son income persistence in Denmark is about half 
the size of that in Sweden. 
A possible explanation for the lower intergenerational income persistence in the top end of the 
income distribution in Denmark compared with Sweden is an inheritance of more capital income 
and bigger companies in Sweden.  
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